l8o FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

The important fact should not be overlooked that the cabinet's
approval has been secured of military appropriations in the 1937-38
budget of ¥727,965,556, the largest Army appropriations in the
history of Japan and an increase of ¥219,648,856 over the 1936*37
figure. There is very little likelihood that this amount will be materi-
ally reduced by the Diet,

In conclusion, there seems to be no diminution in the Army's
nfluence on both the domestic and foreign policies of Japan.

NAVAL

With the expiration of December 31, 1936, of the Washington
Naval Treaty of 1921-22 and of the London Naval Treaty of 1930,
Japan enters the new year in a non-treaty status vis-&-vis the major
naval powers of the world. She faces the possibility of unlimited
competition in naval construction from the United States and Great
Britain and she is confronted with the possibility of greatly increased
fortification by these two powers of their Pacific and Far Eastern
possessions. This situation has been, of course, brought about by
the action of Japan (i) in giving notice in December, 19343 of her
intention to abrogate the naval treaties; (2) in withdrawing from the
London Naval Conference of 1936 and refusing thereafter to adhere
to the Three-Power Treaty; and (3) in permitting the treaties to
lapse on December 31, 1936, without entering into any agreement
with the other naval powers either with respect to quantitative or
qualitative restrictions or with respect to the restrictions of fortifica-
tions in the Pacific and Far East.

The main reason which impelled Japan to withdraw from the naval
treaties and to refuse to enter into further commitments was, and is,
her passionate unwillingness to bind herself legally and contractually
to a position of inferiority ; in short, the 5-5-3 ratio had, in the
minds of the Japanese, so humiliated this country and had so wounded
its amour-propre as to have become intolerable and the nation made
up its mind, probably shortly after the signature of the London Treaty
of 1930, to pay whatever price might be necessary to rid herself of
the stigma of inferiority.

Another, and perhaps no less cogent reason, was the conviction
that the Washington ratios no longer provided Japan with the measure
of security which she felt she enjoyed at the time the treaties were
signed. It cannot be denied that conditions have greatly changed
since 1922 and, especially with regard to aviation, developments have
undoubtedly reduced Japan's security from attack. Furthermore,
the adoption in recent years by Japan of a role of stabilizing factor
in East Asia has rendered it necessary that this country free itself of
restrictions which might hamper the effectiveness of this new policy.

In appraising the results of Japan's action in casting the naval
treaties overboard and choosing to remain in a non-treaty status